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Abstract
In this study, we consider the physical layer security in the downlink of a Massive MIMO system
employing one-bit quantization at the base station (BS). We assume an active eavesdropper that attempts
to spoiling the channel estimation acquisition at the BS for a legitimate user, whereas overhearing on
downlink transmission. We consider the two most widespread methods for degrading the eavesdropper’s
channel, the nullspace artificial noise (NS-AN) and random artificial noise (R-AN). Then, we present
a lower bound on the secrecy rate and asymptotic performance, considering zero-forcing beamforming
(ZF-BF) and maximum-ratio transmission beamforming (MRT-BF). Our results reveal that even when the
eavesdropper is close enough to the intercepted user, a positive secrecy rate –which tends to saturation
with increasing the number of BS antennasN—is possible, as long as the transmit power of eavesdropper
is less than that of the legitimate user during channel training. We show that ZF-BF with NS-AN provides
the best performance. It is found that MRT-BF and ZF-BF are equivalent in the asymptotic limit of N
and hence the artificial noise technique is the performance indicator. Moreover, we study the impact of
power-scaling law on the secrecy rate. When the transmit power of BS is reduced proportional to 1/N ,
the performance is independent of artificial noise asymptotically and hence the beamforming technique
is the performance indicator. In addition, when the BS’s power is reduced proportional to 1/
√
N , all
combinations of beamforming and artificial noise schemes are equally likely asymptotically, independent
of quantization noise. We present various numerical results to corroborate our analysis.
Index Terms
Active eavesdropping, ergodic information leakage, Massive MIMO, one-bit quantization, physical
layer security
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Information secrecy in Massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systemas a key technology for
fifth-generation networkshas been a critical issue that spurred widespread interest [1]–[6]. One challenge
in Massive MIMO lies in the increase in hardware complexity and energy consumption [7] due to a large
number of antennas at the base station (BS). In recent years, there has been a growing interest in replacing
the high-resolution analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) and digital-to-analog converters (DACs) with low-
resolution ADCs and DACs. The extreme case of one-bit ADC/DAC has been gaining much attention
[8]–[11] because of the considerable design simplicity offered to the physical layer and negligible energy
consumption. With this in mind, it is of interest to understand the secrecy capability of Massive MIMO
employing one-bit quantization, which is the aim of this work.
In a major advance in 1949, Claude Shannon [12] established the information-theoretic basis of
communication secrecy of cryptographic systems. In classical security, the transmitter often shields the
private message by a means of shared-key cryptographic techniques carried out at the logical layers of
the network. Typically, the encryption key is very long and computationally demanding. In addition, it is
susceptible to interception by powerful adversaries, especially in a wireless environment. Consequently,
a key exchange between two legitimate parties becomes infeasible in dynamic wireless networks with
nodes of limited resources. To tackle this problem, physical layer security provides an alternative or a
complement to classical cryptography, which exploits the statistical differences between the channel of
the legitimate receiver and that of the eavesdropper to guarantee secrecy.
The first information-theoretic approach to physical layer security dates back to Wyner’s work [13] on
the degraded Gaussian wiretap channel. Later, Csiszar and Korner [14] generalized Wyner’s work to the
non-degraded wiretap channel. In the preceding works of Wyner, Csiszar, and Korner, it was shown that
when the channel of the legitimate receiver is more capable (less noisy) than that of the eavesdropper,
secure communication is possible with no need for classical cryptography. The maximal rate at which the
transmitter and legitimate receiver can communicate securely is limited by the secrecy capacity, defined
as the maximal of the difference between the channel mutual information of the legitimate receiver and
that of the eavesdropper.
In the literature, passive attack refers to the situation where an eavesdropper is concealing himself
and thus only eavesdropping on the confidential transmission. On the other hand, active attack refers to
the situation where an eavesdropper is not only eavesdropping on the confidential transmission but also
jamming the transmission. In the literature, many attempts have been made [1], [6], [15]–[17] to study
the impact of the passive attack in Massive MIMO systems under different scenarios. One common thing
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3among most of the above works and others in the literature is the use of artificial noise to degrade the
eavesdropper channel [5] and hence improve security. Most of the above works focus on the careful design
of data beamforming (or precoding) and artificial noise. In the literature, two artificial noise techniques
are widely used, the nullspace artificial noise (NS-AN) and random artificial noise (R-AN) [5]. With
NS-AN, the artificial noise is made aligned with the nullspace of the channel of the legitimate user while
with the R-AN, the artificial noise is generated randomly.
Massive MIMO has been considered as one of the key technologies enabling green communication
for its ability to scale down the transmitted power while maintaining a minimum quality of service to
each user in the system. Thus minimizing power (transmitted and circuit power consumption [18]) while
achieving secure communication simultaneously is of great importance [19]. Besides, one of the constrains
in wireless communication is the limited battery life of wireless devices [20]–[23]. Thus maximizing the
energy harvested while satisfying the requirement of secure communication turns out to be of importance
in current and future networks. Z. Zhu et al., [23] studied the information secrecy under the simultaneous
wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) MIMO system, where the authors proposed a low-
complexity iterative algorithm to optimize the design of beamforming to maximize the harvested energy
and meeting secrecy rate requirements simultaneously. In [21] a joint optimization of beamforming and
AN in a multiuser MIMO system is considered under target secrecy rate and transmit and harvested
power constraints.
Stemming from the fact that meeting physical layer security in the information-theoretic sense may
give rise to a significant loss in data rate, Bin Chen et al., [3] considers a cryptographic-like scheme
to achieve security in Massive MIMO system in the presence of a powerful eavesdropper. In [3], the
message symbols are randomly phase rotated while this phase rotation is only available at the legitimate
receiver through downlink training with a small amount of overhead. There, it is shown that when the
BS is equipped with a sufficiently large number of antennas, we guarantee secure communication with
high probability.
It is well-known that the promising gains of Massive MIMO systems [24]–[27] are affected by pilot
contamination [28], [29], whether resulting from pilot reuse [28] in multi-cellular networks or pilot attack
[4], [30], [31] created intentionally by an active eavesdropper. In fact, the pilot attack can cause serious
degradation of the secrecy rate since the beamformed signal in the downlink will be partly aligned with the
direction of eavesdropper’s channel, thereby increasing the information leakage. This situation becomes
more pronounced when the pilot attack is severe, under which no positive secrecy rate is possible.
Many attempts [32]–[36] with the purpose of detecting and combating pilot attack in Massive MIMO
have been done. Yuksel et al., [32] showed that pilot attack can be eliminated asymptotically as the size
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4of the pilot set (which is assumed known to everyone) is increased as long as users select their pilots
randomly. Q. Xiong et al., [33] proposed an efficient energy-based detector to identify a pilot attack
without the knowledge of the channel state information (CSI). T. T. Do et al., [34] considered a single-
user uplink Massive MIMO and studied two anti-jamming strategies based on pilot re-transmission and
pilot adaptation technique. R. F. Schaefer et al., [36] studied the secrecy and pilot attack detection in a
single-cell Massive MIMO in the presence of a single-antenna eavesdropper. There, it is shown that the
secrecy rate can drop to zero as the power of eavesdropper is increased. Tan et al., [35] considered pilot
jamming in the uplink and proposed jamming-resistant approach using unused pilot and pilot hopping to
estimate the jamming channel. With zero-forcing type receiver, it is shown in [35] that we can greatly
enhance the robustness of the Massive MIMO uplink against jamming attacks.
In multicell multiuser Massive MIMO systems, although pilot contamination resulting from reuse
of pilot across the network can be alleviated through coordination between different BSs with low
overhead [37] (also see [38] for interference alignment-based approach), however, the pilot attack can
still pose a real performance risk. Wu et al., [31] considered an active eavesdropper armed with multiple
antennas, and presented signal design using beamforming based on maximum-ratio transmission and NS-
AN technique under the correlated channel. They showed that the NS-AN can benefit from the highly
correlated channels, enabling secure communication; however, this is not the case when the channel is
weakly correlated or independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). To overcome the limitation in [31],
the authors in [39] considered pilot-data exploitation for CSI acquisition. They showed that decreasing
the legitimate user’s power causes its received signal to lie in a different eigenspace as that of the
eavesdropper in the asymptotic limit of data length, thus mitigating the effect of a strong pilot attack.
Using low-resolution ADCs/DACs at the BS in Massive MIMO can substantially simplify the physical
layer and reduce energy consumption, particularly when the one-bit quantization is considered. A related
challenge is the design of the channel estimator and the precoder [40], [41] which turns to be not trivial as
the quantization can break the structure of the beamforming matrix. This challenge can exacerbate when
a pilot attack is present in the system. In [42] the design of artificial noise is investigated in a simple
scenario of a multiple-antenna system under the constraint of a few RF chains at the BS, considering a
passive eavesdropper and perfect CSI at the BS. The impact of hardware impairment (such as phase noise
and amplified receiver noise) on secrecy in Massive MIMO is studied in [43] and hence both the uplink
training and the design of artificial noise are optimized to enhance secrecy under a passive eavesdropper.
More recently, a low-resolution Massive MIMO system with multiple-antenna passive eavesdropper was
studied in [44]. With perfect CSI assumed available at the BS, it was shown that quantization noise gives
rise to the increase in secrecy rate.
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5The main limitation of the previous studies on the secrecy of Massive MIMO system with quantization
or limited RF chains at the BS is the focus on passive attack scenarios with the assumption of perfect
CSI at the BS. As far as quantization is concerned, the assumption of perfect CSI becomes inaccurate
even in the absence of pilot contamination and in particular, the perfect CSI is unjustified when the
extreme one-bit quantization case is considered. Also, of even greater importance is the impact of active
eavesdropping on secrecy in quantized Massive MIMO systems, which is not well understood in the
literature. In this work, we will particularly study the one-bit quantized Massive MIMO system with an
active eavesdropper, and investigate its secrecy performance under various beamforming and artificial
noise techniques.
As a first step toward understanding the potential secrecy in such quantized systems, we will investi-
gate only the performance under the zero-forcing and maximum ratio combining (or matched filtering)
beamformers combined with two widely used techniques for degrading the quality of the eavesdropper’s
channel: nullspace and random artificial noise techniques.
A. Contributions
We summarize the main contributions of this work as follows:
1) We derive lower bounds on secrecy rate under various beamforming and artificial noise schemes, and
an asymptotic performance analysis (when the number of BS antennas N →∞) is given.
2) We show analytically (as N →∞) a threshold on the transmit power ratio between the eavesdropper
and intercepted user below which a positive secrecy rate is possible. As a result, when the eavesdropper
is near enough to the intercepted user, secure communication turns to be difficult (if not impossible)
when the transmit ratio is close to 1. This result is confirmed by simulation of a practical scenario.
3) We show that when there is no power scaling at the BS (i.e., power is not scaled down by the number
of BS antennas), NS-AN technique outperforms R-AN technique, regardless of beamforming technique,
as N →∞.
4) We show that when the power at the BS is reduced proportional to 1/N , the zero-forcing beamforming
(ZF-BF) outperforms maximum-ratio transmission beamforming (MRT-BF), regardless of artificial noise.
Further, when the power is reduced proportional to 1/
√
N all schemes (any combination of beamforming
and artificial noise techniques) are asymptotically equivalent and also quantization noise is irrelevant.
B. Outline
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section II introduces signal models in uplink and downlink
and we discuss channel estimation. Section III presents the design of downlink beamforming and artificial
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6noise. Also, we show the analysis of information rates, the main results and specializing the main results
to an unquantized system and a quantized system with passive eavesdropping. In Section IV, we present
the asymptotic performance comparison and we derive the condition under which secure communication
is possible. In Section V, we present some numerical examples to verify our analytical results and Section
VI concludes this work.
C. Notation
Throughout this paper we use the superscript T to denote transposition and the superscript H to
denote hermitian transpose, E[·] and Var(·) denote the expected value and variance of a random variable,
respectively. Boldface capital letterX denotes a random matrix, boldface small letter x denotes a random
vector, small letter in normal font x denotes a scalar random variable, big letter in normal font X is
typically used to denote a system parameter. We denote by ‖x‖ the Euclidean norm of a vector x, [X ]i
denotes the i-th diagonal entry of a matrixX , diag(a1, a2, · · · ) denotes a diagonal matrix with a1, a2, · · ·
comprise its diagonal, and tr(·) denotes the matrix trace. The pointwise operations log(·), sign(·),ℜ{·}
and ℑ{·} denote the logarithm to base 2, sign function, real and imaginary parts of a scalar, vector or
matrix, respectively.
II. SIGNAL MODEL AND CHANNEL ESTIMATION
We consider the downlink of a single-cell Massive MIMO system with one-bit ADCs/DACs employed
at the BS. We assume that the BS has N antennas, serving K single-antenna users (K ≪ N ) in the same
time-frequency resource block. We assume the communication system operates in the time-division duplex
(TDD) mode. Further, we assume a single-antenna active eavesdropper who attacks the communication
between a legitimate user and the BS by contaminating its CSI acquisition at the BS during channel
training and overhearing on the downlink transmission.
We consider Rayleigh block-fading for both BS-users and BS-eavesdropper channels with coherence
time Tc. Within each block, the channel remains constant over Tc symbol intervals and changes indepen-
dently from one block to another. The composite small-scale fading channel between all legitimate users
and the BS is denoted by H = [h1,h2, · · · ,hK ] ∈ CN×K and g ∈ CN represents the small-scale fading
channel between the eavesdropper and the BS. The (n, j)-th component of H, denoted hnj , represents
the propagation gain between the n-th BS antenna and user j, whereas gn denotes the propagation gain
between the BS antenna n and the eavesdropper. BothH and g comprise i.i.d. complex Gaussian random
variables, each with zero-mean and unit variance. Further, we denote by βj & βe the large-scale fading
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7coefficients associated with legitimate user j and the eavesdropper, respectively. We assume all large-
scale fading coefficients change slowly in order of several Tc intervals and hence assumed available to
everyone. Since we are interested in the downlink rate, we divide the coherence time into two parts;
one for training (over τ symbol intervals) and the other for downlink transmission (over Tc − τ symbol
intervals).
A. Uplink signal model
At the start of communication, all legitimate users in the system send mutually orthogonal pilot
sequences of length τ symbols in the uplink for channel estimation at the BS, whereas the eavesdropper
concurrently transmits the same pilot sequence of user k (intercepted user) to impair its channel acquisition
at the BS (see Fig. 1). We denote by Ψ = [ψ1,ψ2, · · · ,ψK ]T ∈ CK×τ the pilot matrix satisfying
ΨΨ
H = τIK . The j-th pilot sequence is expressed as ψj = [ψj(1), ψj(2), · · · , ψj(τ)]T ∈ Cτ where
ψj(t) is a discrete-time pilot symbol sent from user j at time t. For simplicity of analysis, there is no
loss of generality in assuming the pilot symbols {ψj(t)} to have unit modulus, i.e., |ψj(t)|2 = 1.
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Fig. 1: System model in uplink.
Thus, the discrete-time received signal at the BS during τ symbol intervals can be written as
Y =
K∑
j=1
√
p′jhjψ
T
j +
√
p′egψ
T
k +Z (1)
where p′j and p
′
e are the average received power at the BS from user j and eavesdropper, respectively,
i.e.,
p′j = βjpj (2a)
p′e = βepe (2b)
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8where pj and pe are the average transmit powers of user j and eavesdropper, respectively. The matrix
Z ∈ CN×τ denotes a complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with i.i.d. CN (0, 1) entries.
Let yTn = [yn(1), yn(2), · · · , yn(τ)] be the n-th row of Y (i.e., signal received by BS antenna n) and
zTn = [zn(1), zn(2), · · · , zn(τ)] be the n-th row of Z. Thus yTn can be expressed as
yTn =
K∑
j=1
√
p′jhnjψ
T
j +
√
p′egnψ
T
k + z
T
n . (3)
We observe that the row vectors of Y are independent of each other and have the common covariance
matrix given by
Cyn = Ψ
HP ′Ψ+ p′eψ
∗
kψ
T
k + Iτ . (4)
where P ′ = diag(p′1, · · · , p′K) is a diagonal matrix. Therefore, it suffices to consider the signal model
(3) for our analysis. From (3), the t-th component of yTn is given by
yn(t) =
K∑
j=1
√
p′jhnjψj(t) +
√
p′egnψk(t) + zn(t). (5)
Then, the signal after the one-bit quantizer (one-bit ADC) attached to the n-th BS antenna is expressed
as
vn(t) = sign(yn(t)), t = 1, 2, · · · , τ (6)
where sign(·) is the sign function which yields the sign of the real and imaginary parts of yn(t) indepen-
dently. Here we assume a zero-threshold quantizer. Accordingly, the constellation of the quantized signal
corresponds to the quadrature phase-shift keying constellation, i.e., A = 1√
2
{1+ j, 1− j,−1+ j,−1− j}.
Because of the non-linearity of (6), the analysis is difficult. However, since yn(t) is a Gaussian random
variable, it holds from the Bussgang theorem [45] that we may express (6) as a sum of a scaled version
of yn(t) and an uncorrelated term (quantization noise) [46] [11], i.e.,
vn(t) = γyn(t) + qn(t) (7)
where γ < 1 is a scaling factor and qn(t) is the quantization noise uncorrelated to yn(t). From (7), γ
is obtained by the linear minimum mean squared error (LMMSE) solution, i.e., γ = E[y∗n(t)vn(t)]/σ
2
y ,
resulting in quantization noise with minimum variance. From [45] (see also [46] [11]), E[y∗n(t)vn(t)] =√
2σ2y/pi, where σ
2
y is the variance of yn(t). Hence,
γ =
√
2
piσ2y
=
√
2/pi∑K
j=1 p
′
j + p
′
e + 1
. (8)
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9Substituting (8) in (7), the variance of quantization noise is
σ2q = E[|vn(t)|2]− γ2E[|yn(t)|]
= 1− 2/pi ≈ 0.3634. (9)
Stacking the successive symbols vn(t)(t = 1, 2, · · · , τ) in a row vector vTn = [vn(1), vn(2), · · · , vn(τ)],
we obtain
vTn = γy
T
n + q
T
n (10)
where qTn = [qn(1), qn(2), · · · , qn(τ)].
In this work the quantization noise is assumed uncorrelated [11], i.e., Cqn = σ
2
qIτ . This can be
justified as follows. Using (10) the covariance matrix (or correlation) of qTn can be written as [46] [11]
Cqn = Cvn − γ2Cyn
=
2
pi
sin−1
[
Σ
−1/2
yn
CynΣ
−1/2
yn
]
− γ2Cyn (11)
where Cvn is the covariance matrix of vn and Σyn is the diagonal matrix constructed from the diagonal
entries of Cyn . It is seen from (11) that when the input of quantizer is uncorrelated (i.e., Cyn ∝ Iτ ) so
is the quantization noise. Note that the diagonal entries of Cyn are all equal to σ
2
y =
∑K
j=1 p
′
j + p
′
e + 1,
while the off-diagonal entries can be expressed as
Cyn(t, t
′) =
K∑
i=1
p′i ψ
∗
i (t)ψi(t
′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ejφi(t,t′)
+p′eψ
∗
k(t)ψk(t
′), t 6= t′ (12)
From (12) we observe that when K is sufficiently large, the magnitudes of off-diagonal entries of
Cyn are really much smaller than its diagonal entries, i.e., σ
2
y ≫ |Cyn(t, t′)|, due to the sum of a large
number of weighted complex exponentials having distinct phases in (12). Thus we can approximate Cyn
as a diagonal matrix, i.e., Cyn ≈ σ2yIτ , leading to Cqn ≈ σ2qIτ . Finally, without loss of generality, in
this work we assume τ = K ≫ 1.
B. Channel estimation
To estimate the propagation gain hnl (from user l to BS antenna n), the BS correlates (10) with the
pilot sequence of user l. Hence,
v˜l :=
1√
τ
vTnψ
∗
l =
1√
τ
τ∑
t=1
ψ∗l (t)vn(t)
=
√
γ2τp′lhnl +
√
γ2τp′egnδ(l − k) + γz˜l + q˜l (13)
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where z˜l = z
T
nψ
∗
l /
√
τ and q˜l = q
T
nψ
∗
l /
√
τ are zero-mean scalar random variables with variances 1 and
σ2q , respectively.
Using (13) the LMMSE estimate of hnl reads
hˆnl =
γ
√
p′lτ
γ2p′lτ + γ
2p′eτδ(l − k) + γ2 + σ2q
v˜l := λlv˜l (14)
and therefore the variance of hˆnl is
σ2
hˆl
=
γ2p′lτ
γ2p′lτ + γ2p′eτδ(l − k) + γ2 + σ2q
. (15)
Stacking all channel estimates in a matrix form, the composite channel estimate, denoted Ĥ , can be
written as
Ĥ = VΨHΛ/
√
τ (16)
where Λ = diag(λ1, λ2, · · · , λK) ∈ RK×K is a diagonal matrix and V ∈ CN×τ is the quantized signal
corresponding to Y , where the (n, t)-th entry of V is defined in (6). Finally, we remark that the channel
estimates hˆnl are treated as i.i.d. CN (0, σ2hˆl), thanks to the law of large numbers. This follows from the
fact that v˜l is typically comprised of a sum of a large number of random variables.
C. Downlink signal model
Over one symbol interval, the BS synthesizes the following signal vector (complex baseband precoded
signal):
x˜ =
√
θ
η
Ws︸ ︷︷ ︸
information
+
√
θ¯
ζ
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
artificial noise
(17)
where s = [s1, s2, · · · , sK ]T comprises K independent complex Gaussian information symbols, i.e.,
sj ∼ CN (0, 1), W = [w1,w2, · · · ,wK ] ∈ CN×K is the precoding (or beamforming) matrix with
wj being the j-th column of W , and n = [n1, n2, · · · , nN ]T ∈ CN is a zero-mean complex artificial
noise vector generated deliberately to weaken the eavesdropper’s channel. In (17), η and ζ are long-term
normalization constants given by η = E[tr(WWH)] and ζ = E[‖n‖2]. Further, θ ∈ (0, 1) and θ¯ = 1−θ
are the power fractions allocated to the beamformed signal and artificial noise, respectively. Consequently,
we have E[‖x˜‖2] = 1.
Then, after the one-bit quantizers at the BS, the signs of the real and imaginary part of x˜ are retrieved
(pointwise). The complex baseband representation of the transmitted signal is thus given by
x =
√
pd/N sign(x˜) (18)
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Fig. 2: System model in downlink.
where the scaling factor
√
pd/N is introduced to restrict the average transmit power at the BS to pd.
The system model in downlink in depicted in Fig. 2.
Since x˜ is a unit norm vector and we consider the channel matrix H drawn from random Gaussian
matrix ensembles, the variance of each component of the precoded signal x˜ turns to be σ2x˜ = 1/N . By
linearizing the nonlinear model in (18) as we have discussed previously, we can express (18) as
x =
√
pd
N
(γ¯x˜+ q¯)
=
√
θγ¯2pd
Nη
Ws+
√
θ¯γ¯2pd
Nζ
n+
√
pd
N
q¯
=
√
2θpd
piη
Ws+
√
2θ¯pd
piζ
n+
√
pd
N
q¯ (19)
where q¯ is the quantization noise, which is assumed to be uncorrelated, i.e., C q¯ = σ
2
qIN and γ¯ is a
scaling factor given by
γ¯ :=
√
2
piσ2x˜
=
√
2N
pi
. (20)
For simplicity of notation, we express (19) as
x = c1Ws+ c2n+ c3q¯ (21)
where c1, c2 and c3 are, respectively, defined as
c1 =
√
2θpd/piη (22a)
c2 =
√
2θ¯pd/piζ (22b)
c3 =
√
pd/N. (22c)
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Remark 1. To retrieve the unquantized signal model from the quantized signal model (19), we simply
replace pd by pdpi/2 and let σ
2
q = 0.
III. SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we establish the achievable rate Rk of the intercepted user k, and an upper bound on
the eavesdropper’s rate Re. We use the underline and overline notation to distinguish between a lower
bound and upper bound, respectively. Then the achievable secrecy rate Rs is given by [1] [14]
Rs =
[
Rk −Re
]+
(23)
where [A]+ = A when A > 0 and [A]+ = 0 when A < 0.
A. Data beamforming and artificial noise
In this work, we will consider two classical beamforming techniques: the maximum ratio transmission
beamforming (MRT-BF) and zero-forcing beamforming (ZF-BF). Using the channel estimate Ĥ in (16),
the beamforming matrices of MRT-BF and ZF-BF are thus given by
W :=
Ĥ
∗
MRT-BF,
Ĥ
∗ (
Ĥ
T
Ĥ
∗)−1
ZF-BF.
(24)
For the artificial noise, the vector n in (17) is defined by
n = Sn˜ (25)
where S is a shaping matrix and n˜ is an N × 1 Gaussian vector with i.i.d. CN (0, 1) components. In
this work, we will consider the two widely known designs of artificial noise; the R-AN and NS-AN. In
the R-AN approach, the noise is purely random, which points to no specific direction. Therefore, we let
S = IN , thus n = n˜. When NS-AN approach is used, n ∈ nullspace(Ĥ
T
), i.e.,
Ĥ
T
S = 0K×K . (26)
This means that under unquantized systems, when the channel estimate is sufficiently accurate and both
user and eavesdropper channels are not highly correlated, a large part of the nullspace artificial noise
will be annihilated at the user while it is observed as a random noise at the eavesdropper, degrading its
channel quality. To satisfy (26), we simply choose S to be the orthogonal complement matrix of Ĥ
T
,
given by S = IN − Ĥ
∗
(Ĥ
T
Ĥ
∗
)−1Ĥ
T
.
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We summarize:
S :=

IN R-AN,
IN − Ĥ
∗
(Ĥ
T
Ĥ
∗
)−1Ĥ
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
P proj
NS-AN.
(27)
Next the beamforming and AN normalization constants η and ζ in (17) are evaluated as follows. Let
the channel estimate Ĥ be decomposed as
Ĥ = H˜Σ1/2 (28)
where H˜ is a random Gaussian matrix with i.i.d. CN (0, 1) components, andΣ = diag(σ2
hˆ1
, σ2
hˆ2
, · · · , σ2
hˆK
)
is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements comprise the row vector (σ2
hˆ1
, σ2
hˆ2
, · · · , σ2
hˆK
).
Thus, when MRT-BF is used we have that
ηmrt = E[tr(WmrtW
H
mrt)]
= E[tr(Σ1/2H˜
T
H˜
∗
Σ
1/2)]
= tr(Σ1/2E[H˜
T
H˜
∗
]Σ1/2) = N tr(Σ) (29)
and when ZF is used, we can write
ηzf = E[tr(W
H
zfW zf)]
= E[tr(Σ−1/2(H˜
T
H˜
∗
)−1Σ−1/2)]
= tr(Σ−1/2E[(H˜
T
H˜
∗
)−1]Σ−1/2) =
tr(Σ−1)
N −K (30)
where in (30) we have used E[(H˜
T
H˜
∗
)−1] = (N −K)−1IK , which follows from the property of the
inverse of central Wishart matrix H˜
T
H˜
∗
[47].
From (27), the respective AN normalization constants corresponding to R-AN and NS-AN are
ζr-an = E[tr(IN )] = N (31)
ζns-an = E[tr(IN − P proj)(IN − P proj)H ]
= E[tr(IN − P proj)]
= N −K. (32)
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By substituting the above derived normalization constants in (22), we again rewrite (22) as
c1 =

√
2θpd/piN tr(Σ) MRT-BF√
2θpd(N −K)/piN tr(Σ−1) ZF-BF
(33)
c2 =

√
2θ¯pd/piN if R-AN,√
2θ¯pd/pi(N −K) if NS-AN.
(34)
c3 =
√
pd/N. (35)
B. Data rates analysis
The received signal at the intercepted user k is
rk =
√
βkc
2
1h
T
kwksk +
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
√
βkc
2
1h
T
kwjsj
+
√
βkc
2
2h
T
kSn˜+
√
βkc
2
3h
T
k q¯ + νk (36)
and the eavesdropper receives
re =
√
βec21g
Twksk +
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
√
βec21g
Twjsj
+
√
βec22g
TSn˜+
√
βec23g
T q¯ + νe (37)
where both νk, νe ∼ CN (0, 1), denoting the Gaussian noises at the intercepted user and eavesdropper,
respectively.
To obtain a lower bound on secrecy rate, we shall make two main assumptions that have been considered
in the literature, serving as a worst-case scenario [1], [31]. First, to obtain a lower bound on rate achievable
by the legitimate user, we assume the legitimate user has no access to its channel realization and its
beamforming vector, and thus the user utilizes only its knowledge of the long-term statistics of the channel
for decoding. Second, to obtain an upper bound on information leakage, we assume the eavesdropper has
access to its channel realizations and the beamforming vector of intercepted user. Further, we assume
that the eavesdropper can cancel out all inter-user interference, which is conceivable through collusion
of other users with the eavesdropper.
Therefore, after ignoring the second term in (37), we rewrite (37) as
re =
√
βec
2
1g
Twksk +
√
βec
2
2g
TSn˜+
√
βec
2
3g
T q¯ + νe (38)
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and hence an upper bound on the ergodic information rate leaked to the eavesdropper is given by1
Re = E
[
log
(
1 + c21βe
‖wHk g∗‖2
σ2e
)]
(39)
where σ2e is the variance of the effective noise seen by the eavesdropper, given by
σ2e = c
2
2βeg
TSg∗ + c23βeσ
2
q‖g‖2 + 1. (40)
To obtain a lower bound on achievable rate of legitimate user k, we may express (36) as a sum of
signal and uncorrelated noise [37] [11], i.e.,
rk = ask + neff (41)
where a is a deterministic constant which depends only on the statistics of the channel and neff is an
effective noise uncorrelated with sk.
From (41) the variance of neff is given by
σ2neff = E [(rk − ask)(rk − ask)∗] . (42)
Thus, σ2neff is minimized by choosing a according to the optimal estimator in the sense of MMSE which
renders neff uncorrelated with the signal sk. In the view of orthogonality property of optimal estimator,
i.e., E [(rk − ask)s∗k] = 0, it follows that
a = E[s∗krk] = c1
√
βkE[h
T
kwk] (43)
Using this result in (42) yields
σ2neff = E[|rk|2]− |a|2
= c21βk Var(h
T
kwk) +
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
c21βkE[|hTkwj|2]
+ c22βkE[h
T
kSh
∗
k] + βkσ
2
qpd + 1. (44)
where Var(·) is the variance operator. In (40) and (44) we have used the fact that SSH = S for both
R-AN and NS-AN schemes.
Finally, a lower bound on the achievable rate Rk is obtained by treating the non-Gaussian noise neff
(which is uncorrelated with signal) as independent Gaussian noise with the same variance σ2neff [48].
Thus, we have
Rk = log
(
1 +
|a|2
σ2neff
)
. (45)
1In (39) we have treated the quantization noise as Gaussian, which is a technical assumption justified by the law of large
numbers. Note that gT q¯ (third term in (38)) is a sum of N (large) random numbers and hence can be well approximated as
Gaussian random variable.
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For the convenience of exposition and analysis in this paper, we summarize the results for the
eavesdropper and legitimate user in Lemmas 1 and 2 which will be used later in Sec. III-D.
Lemma 1. An upper bound on the ergodic information rate (leakage) of the eavesdropper is given by
Re = E
[
log
(
1 + c21βe
‖wHk g∗‖2
σ2e
)]
(46)
where σ2e = c
2
2βeg
TSg∗ + c23βeσ
2
q‖g‖2 + 1.
Lemma 2. A lower bound on achievable rate of the legitimate user k (intercepted) is given by
Rk = log
(
1 +
|a|2
σ2neff
)
(47)
where a and σ2neff are given by
a = c1
√
βkE[h
T
kwk] (48)
σ2neff = c
2
1βk(Var(h
T
kwk) +
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
E[|hTkwj|2])
+ c22βkE[h
T
kSh
∗
k] + βkσ
2
qpd + 1. (49)
C. Impact of pilot attack
Because of the pilot attack, the estimated channel of the legitimate user k will contain information
(i.e., correlation) about the channel of the eavesdropper. Here, we characterize this information which
turns to be useful in our analysis of the main results.
Lemma 3. The eavesdropper’s channel vector can be expressed as
g =
√
κRhˆk + ǫ (50)
where κR is the received power ratio between the eavesdropper and intercepted user k, i.e.,
κR =
p′e
p′k
=
βepe
βkpk
(51)
and ǫ is uncorrelated Gaussian (approximately) error vector with covariance matrix given by
Cǫ = (1− κRσ2hˆk)IN (52)
Proof. The proof is straightforward which follows from the classical work on MMSE solution. Appendix
A presents the details.
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Although Lemma 3 is a straightforward result, however, it is noteworthy. It can tell us how much
information about the eavesdropper’s channel g ∼ CN (0, IN ) is contained in the channel estimate
hˆk ∼ CN (0, σ2hˆkIN ).
Using Lemma 3, the mutual information between eavesdropper’s and legitimate user’s channels is obtained
as follows:
I(g; hˆk) = h(g)− h(g|hˆk)
= h(g)− h(ǫ)
= N log(pie) −N log
(
pie(1− κRσ2hˆk)
)
= N log
(
1
1− κRσ2hˆk
)
≥ 0, (53)
The intuitive result in (53) indicates that I(g; hˆk) can grow large and will be limited only by AWGN
and quantization noise when κR ≫ 1. The equality in (53) is satisfied when κR = 0, i.e., passive
eavesdropping. Note that when κR ≫ 1 (eavesdropper’s received power is much larger than received
power of legitimate user), σ2
hˆk
becomes very small (i.e., channel estimate becomes unreliable) and vice
versa. However, the product κRσ
2
hˆk
is always less than unity.
Since in particular the nullspace noise is a function of hˆk, which is correlated with g, part of this noise
lives in the nullspace of the eavesdropper’s channel. Thus this part of nullspace noise will be annihilated
at the eavesdropper, giving rise to an increase in his information rate and hence a significant reduction
in secrecy rate.
D. Main theoretical results
Here, we give a lower bound on the achievable secrecy rate under different beamforming and artificial
noise techniques. In the following, all derived information rates are given in their normalized form2.
We state our findings in the following two theorems.
Theorem 1. Consider a one-bit quantized Massive MIMO system with N antennas at the BS and K
single-antenna users in the presence of a single-antenna active eavesdropper. Also, imperfect CSI is
assumed to be available at the BS. If BS uses MRT-BF, then a lower bound on the achievable rate of the
intercepted user k, is given by
RMRTk = log
(
1 +
2θpi−1 tr−1(Σ)βkσ4hˆkpdN
2θβkpd/pi + P
AN
k + βkσ
2
qpd + 1
)
. (54)
2The normalization factor is (1−τ/Tc), i.e., the fraction of time over which downlink transmission is considered in this work.
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Further, if the BS uses ZF-BF, then a lower bound on the achievable rate is given by
RZFk = log
(
1 +
2θpi−1 tr−1(Σ−1)βkpd(N −K)
2θβkpd(1− σ2hˆk)/pi + P
AN
k + βkσ
2
qpd + 1
)
(55)
where PAN is the leakage power of artificial noise seen at the intercepted user k defined as
PANk =
2θ¯βkpd/pi R-AN2θ¯βkpd(1− σ2hˆk)/pi NS-AN.
(56)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Consider the system model in Theorem 1. When the number of base station antennas N is
sufficiently large, an upper bound on the ergodic information rate leaked to the eavesdropper is given
by (equal or approximate)
R
MRT
e
∼= log
1 + 2θβepdσ2hˆk
(
κRσ
2
hˆk
N + 1
)
pi tr(Σ)(PANe + βepdσ
2
q + 1)
 (57)
when the BS uses MRT-BF, and when the BS uses ZF-BF,
R
ZF
e
∼= log
1 + 2θβepd
(
κR(N −K − 1) + σ−2hˆk
)
pi tr(Σ−1)(PANe + βepdσ2q + 1)
 (58)
where κR is the receive power ratio defined in (51) and P
AN
e is the leakage power of artificial noise seen
at the eavesdropper defined as
PANe =
2θ¯βepd/pi R-AN2θ¯βepd(1− κRσ2hˆk)/pi NS-AN.
(59)
Proof. See Appendix C
From (54) and (55) we identify the different components of noise at the legitimate user k as follows.
The term 2θβkpd/pi in (54) or 2θβkpd(1−σ2hˆk)/pi in (55) captures the effect of beamforming gain penalty
3plus inter-user interference, the term PANk captures the leakage power of artificial noise, and the term
βkσ
2
qpd + 1 captures the effect of quantization noise and AWGN. For more details, see Appendix B.
It is clear from (56) and (59) that both the legitimate user and eavesdropper achieve higher data rates
when the BS employs NS-AN than R-AN. Furthermore, their information rates increase with increasing
the number of BS antennas N and decrease with increasing the number of users K. Note that the
3Beamforming gain penalty is due to CSI uncertainty at the user since user relies on channel statistics rather than instantaneous
channel realization.
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dependence of the rates on K when MRT-BF is used is captured by tr(Σ), whereas captured by the
factors N −K and tr(Σ−1) when ZF-BF is used.
Also, by inspecting (56), it is obvious that when perfect CSI is available at the BS, the nullspace noise
seen by the legitimate user becomes 0 due to σ2
hˆk
= 1. That is to say, the artificial noise is perfectly
aligned with the nullspace of the channel. Again, from (59), the assumption of perfect CSI implies
κR = 0 (passive eavesdropper), thus rendering both the random and nullspace artificial noises have the
same negative effect on the information rate from the eavesdroppers perspective.
E. Achievable secrecy rate
From (55) and (58), we rewrite the respective rates RZFk and R
ZF
e as follows:
RZFk = log
(
1 +
2θβkpd(N −K)
A1
)
(60)
R
ZF
e
∼= log
(
1 +
2θβepd (κR(N −K − 1) + σ−2hˆk )
A2
)
(61)
where A1, A2 are defined as
A1=pi tr(Σ
−1)(PANk +
2θβkpd
pi
(1− σ2
hˆk
) + βkσ
2
qpd + 1)
A2=pi tr(Σ
−1)(PANe + βepdσ
2
q + 1). (62)
Using (23), we define RZFs (pd, θ,N) =
[
RZFk −R
ZF
e
]+
as a lower bound on secrecy rate4 when ZF-BF
is used. Thus
RZFs (pd, θ,N) =
[
log
(
1 +
2θβkpd(N −K)
A1
)
− log
(
1+
2θβepd(κR(N −K − 1) + σ−2hˆk )
A2
)]+
=
[
log
(
2A2θσ
2
hˆk
pdβkN + C1
2A1θκRσ
2
hˆk
pdβeN + C2
)]+
(63)
where C1 and C2 are defined as
C1 = A2(A1 − 2θKpdβk)σ2hˆk
C2 = A1(A2σ
2
hˆk
− 2θpdβe(κR(K + 1)σ2hˆk − 1))
(64)
Likewise, from (54) and (57), we write the respective rates RMRTk and R
MRT
e as follows:
RMRTk = log
(
1 +
2θβkσ
4
hˆk
pdN
B1
)
(65)
4The explicit use of the parameters pd, θ and N in the secrecy rate is introduced only for reasons of mathematical convenience.
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R
MRT
e
∼= log
(
1 +
2θβepdσ
2
hˆk
(κRσ
2
hˆk
N + 1)
B2
)
(66)
where B1 and B2 are defined as
B1 = pi tr(Σ)(2θβkpd/pi + P
AN
k + βkσ
2
qpd + 1)
B2 = pi tr(Σ)(P
AN
e + βepdσ
2
q + 1).
(67)
Denoting RMRTs (pd, θ,N) =
[
RMRTk −R
MRT
e
]+
as a lower bound on secrecy rate when MRT-BF is
employed, thus we write
RMRTs (pd, θ,N) =
[
log
(
1 +
2θβkσ
4
hˆk
pdN
B1
)
− log
(
1+
2θβepdσ
2
hˆk
(κRσ
2
hˆk
N + 1)
B2
)]+
=
[
log
(
2B2θσ
4
hˆk
pdβkN +C3
2B1θκRσ4hˆk
pdβeN + C4
)]+
(68)
where C3 and C4 are defined as
C3 = B1B2
C4 = B1B2 + 2B1θσ
2
hˆk
pdβe.
(69)
Because of the concavity of the log(·) and the non-monotonic behavior of RZFk − R
ZF
e and R
MRT
k −
R
MRT
e with respect to θ, the lower bounds (63) and (68) can be maximized with respect to θ. The
optimal θ maximizing the secrecy rates RMRTs (pd, θ,N) and R
ZF
s (pd, θ,N) can be found by solving
dRMRTs (pd, θ,N)/dθ = 0 and dR
ZF
s (pd, θ,N)/dθ = 0 for θ ∈ (0, 1).
Due to the cumbersome algebraic expressions of optimal θ, we omit them and hence compute the
optimal values numerically instead. As shown in the next section, it turns out that when all parameters
are fixed, the optimal policy is to allocate almost all power to artificial noise (i.e., signal power becomes
infinitesimal) in the asymptotic limit of N .
F. Secrecy rate under passive eavesdropping
Passive eavesdropping corresponds to the situation where the eavesdropper does not transmit any signal
(i.e., pe = 0, κR = 0) to conceal himself and his harm is limited only by eavesdropping on the downlink
transmission to decode the confidential message sent to the legitimate user. Based on the CSI’s availability
at the BS, we study the following two scenarios.
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RP-ICSIs =

[
log
(
1 + 2 tr
-1(Π)ξ4kθpdβkN
pdβk(2θ+piσ2q)+pi(P ANk,P-ICSI+1)
)
− log
(
1 + 2 tr
-1(Π)ξ2kθpdβe
pdβe(2−2θ+piσ2q)+pi
)]+
MRT-BF[
log
(
1 + 2 tr
-1(Π−1)θpdβk(N−K)
pdβk(2θ−2ξ2kθ+piσ2q)+pi(P ANk,P-ICSI+1)
)
− log
(
1 +
2 tr-1(Π−1)ξ−2k θpdβe
pdβe(2−2θ+piσ2q)+pi
)]+
ZF-BF
(71)
RP-PCSIs =

[
log
(
1 + 2θpdβkN/K
pdβk(2θ+piσ2q)+pi(P ANk,P-PCSI+1)
)
− log
(
1 + 2θpdβe/K
pdβe(2−2θ+piσ2q)+pi
)]+
MRT-BFlog
(
1 +
2pi−1θpdβk(N/K − 1)
pdβkσ2q + P
AN
k,P-PCSI + 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RP-PCSIk
− log
(
1 +
2θpdβe/K
pdβe
(
2− 2θ + piσ2q
)
+ pi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RP-PCSIe

+
ZF-BF
(73)
Passive eavesdropping with imperfect CSI (P-ICSI): Perfect CSI is rarely available at the BS, and hence
it needs to be estimated beforehand. To specialize our results of the quantized system to this scenario, we
redefine the variance of channel estimate σ2
hˆl
and the diagonal matrix Σ derived previously as follows:σ
2
hˆl
pe=0−−−→ ξ2l = γ
2p′lτ
γ2p′lτ+γ
2+σ2q
Σ
pe=0−−−→ Π = diag(ξ21 , ξ22 , · · · , ξ2K).
(70)
Substituting (70) in Theorem 1, (70) with κR = 0 in Theorem 2, and using the definition (23), we
obtain the achievable secrecy rate RP-ICSIs shown in (71) (on the top of this page), where P
AN
k,P-ICSI is
defined as
PANk,P-ICSI =

2θ¯pdβk
pi R-AN
2θ¯pdβk(1−ξ2k)
pi NS-AN.
(72)
Passive eavesdropping with perfect CSI (P-PCSI): The assumption of perfect CSI at the BS corresponds
to ξl = 1 and hence Π = IK . Thus, substituting ξk = 1 and Π = IK in (71) and (72), the secrecy rate
in (73) (on the top of this page) follows directly, where
PANk,P-PCSI =
2θ¯pdβk/pi R-AN0 NS-AN. (74)
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The result of ZF-BF in (73) can be directly obtained from [ [44],eq. (27)]5.
Finally, we remark that under passive eavesdropping, both R-AN and NS-AN look like random noise
from the perspective of eavesdropper and hence they have the same effect on his rate. Further, while
the achievable rate of legitimate user increases with increasing N , however, the eavesdropper’s rate is
independent of the number of BS antenna. Therefore, the secrecy rate steadily increases with N , contrary
to the case of active eavesdropping with a single-antenna eavesdropper. This observation has already been
reported in the literature (i.e., see [4]) under unquantized systems and hence it holds true for quantized
systems as well.
G. Secrecy rate in unquantized system
With the unquantized system, it is assumed that the BS has access to the original received signal
(uplink) and the transmitted signal (in downlink) undergoes no quantization, i.e., the BS is assumed to
have infinite-resolution ADCs and DACs.
To specialize our results of the quantized system to the unquantized system, we redefine the set of
parameters {pd, σ2q , σ2hˆl ,Σ} as follows:
pd → pdpi/2, σ2q → 0 (Remark1)
σ2
hˆl
σ2q=0,γ=1−−−−−−→ ϑ2l = p
′
lτ
p′lτ+p
′
eτδ(l−k)+1
Σ → Ξ = diag(ϑ21, ϑ22, · · · , ϑ2K).
(75)
Considering the parameters’ replacement (75) in Theorems 1 and 2 and using the definition (23) yields
the achievable secrecy rate as given in (82) shown at the top of page 25, where PANk,UQ and P
AN
e,UQ are,
respectively, given by
PANk,UQ =
θ¯βkpd R-ANθ¯βkpd (1− ϑ2k) NS-AN (76)
PANe,UQ =
θ¯βepd R-ANθ¯βepd (1− κRϑ2k) NS-AN. (77)
5More specifically, RP-PCSIk in (73) can be directly obtained from [ [44], Eqs. (19) and (20)] and R
P-PCSI
e in (73) is obtained
from [ [44], Eq.(23)] with the assumption that the variance of AWGN at the eavesdropper is 0 and the ratio α = K/N is set
to 0 instead of being fixed as assumed in [44].
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IV. ASYMPTOTIC PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
Inspecting the secrecy rates in (63) and (68) provides no clear clue of how the performance of MRT-
BF and ZF-BF can be compared. Therefore, a better understanding of the performance gap can be
gained through asymptotic performance. Our focus here will be on the asymptotic behavior of the
beamforming/artificial noise schemes as the number of BS antennas increases with no limit. As shown
next, the asymptotic performance renders it easy to capture the important parameters for a specific scheme
to guarantee a positive secrecy rate, which turns to be even very useful for the non-asymptotic case.
In Massive MIMO the transmit power of the BS can be cut down as the number of BS antennas grows
large while maintaining a nonzero data rate for each user in the system, i.e., power-scaling law [26].
Since our concern is the secrecy rate rather than the conventional rate, thus, it is of interest to know
whether the power-scaling law remains valid. That is to say, we seek to see if it is possible to reduce
the transmit power at the BS as N →∞ while maintaining a nonzero secrecy rate.
In the following, we study the asymptotic behavior of the secrecy rate in Massive MIMO system with
and without transmit power scaling at the BS.
A. Massive MIMO with no power scaling
Here, we assume that the transmit power pd at the BS is not scaled down as N grows large (independent
of N ), i.e., no power scaling (no-PS). In the following, we state our results in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Assume the BS uses MRT-BF or ZF-BF. Then when R-AN is used, the maximum secrecy
rate converges to
Rno-PSs,R-AN →
[
log
(
βk(pdβe(piσ
2
q + 2) + pi)
κRβe(pdβk(piσ2q + 2) + pi)
)]+
(78)
and when NS-AN is used, the maximum secrecy rate converges to
Rno-PSs,NS-AN →
[
log
(
βk(pdβe(piσ
2
q + 2− 2κRσ2hˆk) + pi)
κRβe(pdβk(piσ2q + 2− 2σ2hˆk) + pi)
)]+
(79)
asymptotically as N →∞.
Proof. In the following we need to evaluate the secrecy rate RZFs (pd, θ,N) (63) and R
MRT
s (pd, θ,N) (68)
as N →∞, then maximize the resulting expressions with respect to θ.
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Consider the ZF-BF scheme. Taking the limit of (63) as N → ∞ and using the definition of the
leakage power of artificial noise (56) and (59), we obtain
f1(θ) := lim
N→∞
RZFs (pd, θ,N)
=
[
lim
N→∞
log
(
2A2θσ
2
hˆk
pdβkN + C1
2A1θκRσ
2
hˆk
pdβeN + C2
)]+
=
[
log
(
A2βk
A1βeκR
)]+
=
log
 βk(PANe + pdβeσ2q + 1)
κRβe(P
AN
k +
2θβkpd
pi (1− σ2hˆk) + βkσ
2
qpd + 1)
+
=

[
log
(
βk(pdβe(2−2θ+piσ2q)+pi)
κRβe(pdβk(2−2θσ2
hˆk
+piσ2q)+pi)
)]+
R-AN[
log
(
βk(pdβe(2(θ−1)(κRσ2
hˆk
−1)+piσ2q )+pi)
κRβe(pdβk(piσ2q−2σ2hˆk+2)+pi)
)]+
NS-AN.
(80)
When MRT-BF is used, we proceed as follows. Taking the limit of (68) as N → ∞ and using the
definition of the leakage power of artificial noise (56) and (59), we obtain
f2(θ) := lim
N→∞
RMRTs (pd, θ,N)
=
[
lim
N→∞
log
(
2B2θσ
4
hˆk
pdβkN + C3
2B1θκRσ
4
hˆk
pdβeN +C4
)]+
=
[
log
(
B2βk
B1κRβe
)]+
=
[
log
(
βk(P
AN
e + βepdσ
2
q + 1)
κRβe(2θβkpd/pi + P
AN
k + βkσ
2
qpd + 1)
)]+
=

[
log
(
βk(pdβe(−2θ+piσ2q+2)+pi)
κβe(pdβk(piσ2q+2)+pi)
)]+
R-AN[
log
(
βk(pdβe(2(θ−1)(κRσ2
hˆk
−1)+piσ2q)+pi)
κRβe(pdβk(2(θ−1)σ2
hˆk
+piσ2q+2)+pi)
)]+
NS-AN.
(81)
Next, we maximize (80) and (81) with respect to θ. It is easy to verify that the first derivatives ddθf1(θ)
and ddθf2(θ) have no critical points in θ ∈ (0, 1) for both R-AN and NS-AN schemes, and f1(θ) and
f2(θ) are decreasing functions of θ. Thus the value of θ maximizing f1(θ) and f2(θ) coincides with the
left endpoint (θ → 0), i.e., power allocated to signal becomes infinitesimal.
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RUQs =

[
log
(
1 + tr
-1(Ξ)ϑ4kθβkpdN
θpdβk+P ANk,UQ+1
)
− log
(
1 + ϑ
2
kθpdβe(ϑ
2
kκRN+1)
tr(Ξ)(P AN
e,UQ+1)
)]+
MRT-BF[
log
(
1 + θpdβk(N−K) tr
-1(Ξ−1)
θpdβk(1−ϑ2k)+P ANk,UQ+1
)
− log
(
1 +
θpdβe(ϑ−2k +κR(N−K−1))
tr(Ξ−1)(P ANe,UQ+1)
)]+
ZF-BF
(82)
Substituting θ = 0 in (80) and (81), we obtain
Rno-PSs = f1(0) = f2(0)
=

[
log
(
βk(pdβe(piσ2q+2)+pi)
κRβe(pdβk(piσ2q+2)+pi)
)]+
if R-AN[
log
(
βk(pdβe(piσ2q+2−2κRσ2hˆk )+pi)
κRβe(pdβk(piσ2q+2−2σ2hˆk )+pi)
)]+
if NS-AN
(83)
which is independent of the beamforming scheme.
From (78) and (79), a positive secrecy rate is possible if the transmit power ratio (during channel
training) between the eavesdropper and intercepted user satisfies
κT =
pe
pk
< 1 +
piβk (βk − βe)(
pdβk
(
piσ2q + 2
)
+ pi
)
β2e︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆β
. (84)
Further, since (78) and (79) are positive under the same condition (84), we have that
∆no-PS = Rno-PSs,NS-AN −Rno-PSs,R-AN > 0. (85)
We summarize our conclusions from Corollary 1 as follows:
1) The NS-AN outperforms R-AN asymptotically, independent of the beamforming technique.
2) Using R-AN entails more BS antennas to achieve the same performance of NS-AN.
3) Both NS-AN and R-AN are useless when the power ratio constraint in (84) is violated.
B. Massive MIMO with power scaling
Here, we assume that as N → ∞, the transmit power at the BS can be scaled down by a factor of
1/
√
N or 1/N . In the sequel, we use PS1 and PS2 to denote the situations where the transmit power is
proportional to 1/
√
N and 1/N , respectively. Hence,
pd =
ρ
/√
N PS1
ρ
/
N PS2
(86)
where ρ is a fixed value (predetermined at the BS).
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We state our results in the following two corollaries.
Corollary 2. Consider the BS’s transmit power is scaled down by a factor of 1/
√
N . If the BS employs
MRT-BF or ZF-BF, then the maximum secrecy rate converges to
RPS1s →
[
log
(
βk
κRβe
)]+
(87)
irrespective of the artificial noise scheme.
Proof. The result is established by taking the limits of RZFs (ρ/
√
N, θ,N) (63) and RMRTs (ρ/
√
N, θ,N)
(68) as N → ∞ and then maximizing the resulting expressions with respect to θ, following the same
reasoning as the proof for Corollary 1.
Corollary 3. Consider the BS’s transmit power is scaled down by a factor of 1/N . If the BS employs
MRT-BF, then the maximum secrecy rate converges to
RPS2, MRTs →
[
log
(
pi tr(Σ) + 2βkσ
4
hˆk
ρ
pi tr(Σ) + 2βeσ4hˆk
κRρ
)]+
(88)
and when the BS employs ZF-BF, the maximum secrecy rate converges to
RPS2, ZFs →
[
log
(
pi tr(Σ−1) + 2βkρ
pi tr(Σ−1) + 2βeκRρ
)]+
(89)
irrespective of the artificial noise scheme.
Proof. The result is established by taking the limits of RZFs (ρ/N, θ,N) (63) and R
MRT
s (ρ/N, θ,N) (68) as
N →∞ and then maximizing the resulting expressions with respect to θ, following the same reasoning
as the proof for Corollary 1.
By inspection of Corollaries 2 & 3 we can observe that a positive secrecy rate is possible if the transmit
power ratio satisfies
κT =
pe
pk
<
(
βk
βe
)2
. (90)
Since (88) and (89) are both positive under the same condition (90), thus it is easy to show that
∆PS2 = RPS2, ZFs −RPS2, MRTs > 0 (91)
asymptotically.
We summarize our conclusions from Corollaries 2 & 3 as follows:
1) When power scaling at the BS is considered, the asymptotic performance is independent of artificial
noise, contrary to the no-power-scaling regime.
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2) Under PS1, MRT-BF and ZF-BF are equivalent while under PS2 regime, ZF-BF outperforms MRT-
BF, asymptotically.
3) With power scaling at the BS, the asymptotic secrecy rate drops to zero when (90) is violated.
Finally, we close this section with the following.
Remark 2. Corollaries 1–3 can be used to deduce the asymptotic secrecy rate for the passive eaves-
dropping case and the unquantized system, considering the variable replacements as discussed in Sec.
III-F and Sec. III-G.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present some numerical results to verify the analytical results in this work. We
consider a single-cell Massive MIMO system with K single-antenna users and a single-antenna active
eavesdropper. Without loss of generality, we assume β1 = β2 = · · · = βK = βe = 1 and all legitimate
users transmit at the same power, i.e., p1 = p2 = · · · = pk = pu. Unless otherwise stated, analytical results
refer to the achievable secrecy rate using (63) and (68) and Corollaries 1-3 whereas simulation results
refer to simulated achievable secrecy rate evaluated by Monte Carlo simulation with quantization-noise
correlation and exact ergodic information rate leakage (39) are accounted.
In Fig. 3 we show the simulated and theoretical lower and upper bounds on information rates of the
legitimate user and eavesdropper, respectively. We show the results assuming the BS employs nullspace
noise. The topmost and bottommost plots compare the theoretical (using (54),(55), (57) and (58)) bounds
with simulated ones under MRT-BF and ZF-BF, respectively. As can be seen from Fig. 3 that there is a
good match between the analytical and the simulated results.
The achievable secrecy rate corresponding to MRT-BF and ZF-BF is shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5,
respectively, for a different number of BS antennas (N = 32, 64, 128, 256) and as varying θ (allocated
power ratio of signal) between 0 and 1. The eavesdropper’s power is set to pe = pu/2 = 7dB. From Fig.
4, we can observe that the NS-AN (Fig. 4(b)) always outperforms R-AN (Fig. 4(a)) due to a smaller
leakage power of the artificial noise. For example, when N = 256, the performance gap between NS-AN
and R-AN is about 0.1 bits/s/Hz. Likewise, it is evident from Fig. 5 that the use of NS-AN (Fig. 5(b))
provides higher rates compared with R-AN (Fig. 5(a)) under ZF-BF. Further, it is clear that ZF-BF with
NS-AN achieves the highest secrecy rate while MRT-BF with R-AN provides the lowest secrecy rate,
where the gap between them is about 0.3 bits/s/Hz when N = 256. We can observe that the analytical
results serve as a good lower bound on the secrecy rate compared with the simulated results. It is worth
noting that, in the neighborhood of the optimal value of θ where the secrecy rate is peaked, the gap
between the analytical and simulated results is very small.
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Fig. 3: Theoretical and simulated lower bound on achievable user rate and upper bound on eavesdropper
rate under MRT-BF (topmost plot) and ZF-BF (bottommost plot) with NS-AN. We use θ = 0.5, K =
τ = 10, pu = pd = 10dB and pe = 5dB. The theoretical results are obtained by (54),(55), (57), and (58).
Moreover, we observe that in all simulated cases in Figs. 4 and 5, the secrecy rate increases as
the number of BS antennas N increases, while the power fraction allocated to signal is monotonically
decreasing. As N increases, both the intercepted user’s rate and information leakage increase, thus in
order to maintain a positive secrecy rate, more power should be allocated to artificial noise to degrade
the eavesdropper channel (see the proof of Corollary 1).
A. Impact of number of users
Fig. 6 depicts the impact of increasing the number of users on the secrecy rate. As seen, the secrecy
rate decreases steadily as the number of users increases. This, in particular, follows from the increases of
inter-user interference (in case of MRT-BF) and the reduction in the array gain (in case of ZF-BF), thus
reducing the rate of the intercepted user. As observed previously, ZF-BF with NS-AN provides a higher
secrecy rate, albeit at the price of a high computational burden when compared with MRT-BF combined
with R-AN.
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Fig. 4: Achievable secrecy rate of MRT-BF for different number of BS antennas, K = τ = 10, pu =
pd = 10dB and pe = 7dB.
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Fig. 5: Achievable secrecy rate of ZF-BF for different number of BS antennas, K = τ = 10, pu = pd =
10dB and pe = 7dB.
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Fig. 6: The impact of number of users on secrecy rate under ZF-BF and MRT-BF, N = 128, τ = K,
pu = pd = 10dB and pe = 5dB.
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Fig. 7: The impact of transmit power ratio κT = pe/pu, during pilot attack, on secrecy rate, N = 64,
K = τ = 10 and pu = pd = 10dB.
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B. Impact of transmit power ratio
The effect of transmit power ratio κT = pe/pu during the pilot attack is illustrated in Fig. 7. In all
beamforming and artificial noise schemes, we observe that the secrecy rate is steadily reduced as κT
increases. In general, ZF-BF with NS-AN outperforms other schemes as observed previously. However,
the secrecy rate drops to zero for all schemes when κT approaches 1 (0dB). This is in line with the
asymptotic condition derived in (84). From (84), κT < 1 due to βk = βe = 1 in our simulation. Thus in
the absence of an advanced secrecy protocol, active eavesdropping can be deleterious to the secrecy rate.
10 -3 10 -2 10 -1 100 101
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
CD
F
Fig. 8: CDF of secrecy rate for (ZF-BF, NS-AN)-scheme. The BS is positioned in the center of a circle
of radius 1km while the eavesdropper is in a circle of radius 100m around the intercepted user. All users’
positions are random and uniformly distributed in the cell. N = 128, K = τ = 10 and pd = pu = 10dB.
Fig. 8 depicts the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the secrecy rate when the BS employs ZF-
BF and NS-AN, where this scheme is chosen due to its high performance as we have shown before. We
assume thatthe BS is positioned in the center of a circle of radius 1km while the active eavesdropper in a
circle of radius 100m around the intercepted user, i.e., this captures the situation when the eavesdropper
is very close to the intercepted user. The positions of users are assumed random and uniformly distributed
inside the circular cell. As seen in Fig. 8 the average secrecy rate decreases with increasing the power
of eavesdropper. When the eavesdropper transmits at the same power level as the legitimate user, the
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average secrecy drops to zero. This again confirms our analysis and the transmit power-ratio threshold
given in (84) even in this non-asymptotic case.
C. Active Vs. Passive eavesdropping
32 64 128 256 512
1
2
3
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6
    passive
 eavesdropper
     active
 eavesdropper
Fig. 9: Passive vs. active eavesdropping performance comparison under ZF-BF and NS-AN. K = τ = 10
and pd = pu = 10dB. For passive eavesdropping, we show the results for perfect and imperfect knowledge
of CSI, i.e., P-ICSI and P-PCSI. The analytical results for passive eavesdropping use (71) and (73).
We plot in Fig. 9 the theoretical and simulated secrecy rate versus the number of BS antennas in the
presence of active and passive eavesdropping. We show the results for the case of ZF-BF and NS-AN.
We can see that when the eavesdropper is passive (i.e., Pe = 0 or κR = 0), the secrecy rate increases
monotonically with the number of BS antennas under both perfect and imperfect knowledge of CSI
at the BS. This is in line with our analytical expressions in (71) and (73). We remark again that in
unquantized Massive MIMO systems, the monotonic increase of secrecy rate in the presence of a passive
single-antenna eavesdropper has been reported in the literature (i.e., see [4]) and it also holds true for
quantized systems.
However, when an active eavesdropper exists, the secrecy rate becomes drastically small and grows
at a much slower pace as the number of BS antennas N increases, especially when the pilot attack is
strong. Guided by (79) of Corollary 1, the slow growth of secrecy rate with increasing N indicates that
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the secrecy rate will finally saturate as N → ∞. The performance gap between the passive and active
eavesdropping scenarios is significant, even when the transmit power of the eavesdropper is at the noise
level.
Finally, the results of passive eavesdropping demonstrate just how the assumption of perfect CSI may
overestimate the achievable secrecy rate.
D. Quantized Vs. Unquantized systems
50 100 200 300 400
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
simulation,UQ,R-AN [36]
analytical,UQ,R-AN
simulation,UQ,NS-AN [36]
analytical,UQ,NS-AN
simulation,1bit,R-AN
analytical,1bit,R-AN
simulation,1bit,NS-AN
analytical,1bit,NS-AN
50 100 200 300 400
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
simulation,UQ,R-AN
analytical,UQ,R-AN
simulation,UQ,NS-AN
analytical,UQ,NS-AN
simulation,1bit,R-AN
analytical,1bit,R-AN
simulation,1bit,NS-AN
analytical,1bit,NS-AN
MRT-BF ZF-BF
Fig. 10: Performance comparison between the one-bit quantized and unquantized systems under MRT-BF
(leftmost plot) and ZF-BF(rightmost plot). K = τ = 10 and pd = pu = 10dB, Pe = 7dB. The analytical
results for the unquantized system use (82). Dash-dotted and solid lines refer to the one-bit quantized
and unquantized systems, respectively.
In Fig.10, we show the theoretical and simulated secrecy rate for both the one-bit quantized and
unquantized (i.e., infinite-resolution ADCs/DACs at the BS) systems. The impact of quantization noise
on the achievable secrecy rate is captured by the performance gap between the two systems. The larger
the gap, the larger the effect of quantization noise and vice versa. We show the results for MRT-BF
(leftmost plot) and ZF-BF (rightmost plot). It is clear that the secrecy rate achieved by the unquantized
system is larger for all simulated N , especially when the ZF-BF is employed. For example, compared
with the unquantized system, the quantized system requires roughly eight times the number of antennas to
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achieve 0.8 bits/s/Hz when using ZF-BF and NS-AN, while it requires four times the number of antennas
to achieve 0.6 bits/s/Hz when using MRT-BF and NS. However, when R-AN is used, the performance
gap becomes relatively small, when compared with the gap resulting from using NS-AN. Thus the use
of random artificial noise renders the performance loss due to quantization noise smaller.
E. Asymptotic behaviour of secrecy rate
In this subsection, we demonstrate the behavior of secrecy rate as N →∞. For all simulated results,
it is entirely understood that allowing high order of magnitudes of N is used only to show the correct
asymptotic behavior. The simulated results are only shown for a conceivable number of BS antennas,
i.e., N = 32, 64, 128, 512. The asymptotes for the quantized system are given in Corollaries 1-3. And the
asymptotes for the unquantized system is derived from Corollaries 1-3 while considering the parameters’
replacement in (75).
Fig. 11 illustrates the asymptotic behavior of the secrecy rate as N → ∞. As seen, when no power
scaling is used at the BS (topmost plot), both MRT-BF and ZF-BF are asymptotically equivalent. As N
gets larger and larger, almost all power is allocated to artificial noise asymptotically (θ → 0), thus the
artificial noise being used dominates (determines) the performance asymptotically. We can observe that
under the no-PS case, NS-AN outperforms R-AN.
When the BS’s power is scaled down by N (bottommost plot), almost all power should be allocated
to data (θ → 1) to maintain a positive secrecy rate as N → ∞, rendering both R-AN and NS-AN
equivalent asymptotically, and hence the beamforming scheme being used determines the performance.
It is evident that the ZF-BF outperforms MRT-BF. When the power scales down with
√
N (middlemost
plot), any combinations of beamforming and artificial noise schemes are asymptotically equivalent. The
reader will observe the very large number of BS antennas for the no-PS and PS1 cases to converge to the
corresponding asymptotic values, compared with the PS2 case which converges at a much faster pace.
Fig. 12 shows the asymptotic performance gap between the quantized system and its unquantized (i.e.,
infinite-resolution ADCs/DACs) counterpart under no-PS and PS1 power scaling regimes. For the no-PS
case, we observe a comparably larger gap when NS-AN is used whereas it is smaller when R-AN is used,
especially under MRT-BF. Thus when the combination of MRT-BF and R-AN is considered, there is not
much loss in secrecy rate due to quantization noise. We also observe from Fig. 12 (topmost) that both
quantized and unquantized systems are asymptotically equivalent under R-AN, in contrast to NS-AN.
This implies that the leakage power of R-AN dominates the power of quantization noise, whereas the
power of quantization noise dominates the leakage power of NS-AN in the asymptotic limit. For the
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Fig. 11: The asymptotic behaviour of secrecy rate under no-PS (topmost plot), PS1 (middlemost plot) and
PS2 (bottommost plot) power scaling regimes. We use K = τ = 10, pu = 10dB, ρ = 10 dB(fixed power
at BS) and κT = −2dB (pe = 8dB). The three scenarios, no-PS, PS1 and PS2 correspond, respectively, to
pd = ρ, pd = ρ/
√
N and pd = ρ/N . Markers, solid lines and dotted lines represent simulated, analytical
and asymptotic results, respectively.
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Fig. 12: The asymptotic gap of secrecy rate between quantized and unquantized systems under no-PS
(topmost plot) and PS1 (bottommost plot) power scaling regimes. We use K = τ = 10, pu = 10dB,
ρ = 10 dB(fixed power at BS) and κT = −2dB (pe = 8dB). The two scenarios, no-PS and PS1
correspond, respectively, to pd = ρ and pd = ρ/
√
N .
PS1 regime in Fig. 12 (bottommost), the gap diminishes asymptotically under all schemes and hence
quantization noise is irrelevant.
To show that analytically, we present only the case of ZF-BF with NS-AN. The asymptotic rate
corresponding to the unquantized system can be derived from (79) and (87) in Corollaries 1 and 2,
respectively, with parameters’ change in (75). Thus using (75) in (79) and (87) we get
Rno-PS, UQs,NS-AN →
[
log
(
βk
(
pdβe
(
1− κRϑ2k + 1
))
κRβe
(
pd
(
1− ϑ2k
)
βk + 1
))]+ (92)
RPS1, UQs →
[
log
(
βk
κRβe
)]+
(93)
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as N → ∞. It is clear that Rno-PS, UQs,NS-AN > Rno-PSs,NS-AN and RPS1, UQs = RPS1s . Therefore, under the no-PS
regime, both secrecy rates of quantized and unquantized systems converge to distinct limits while under
PS1 regime, both systems converge to the same limits, as N →∞.
Finally, for the case of PS2 which is not shown here, one can verify that the secrecy rate for the
unquantized system converges to different asymptotic limits for ZF-BF and MRT-BF where the artificial
noise scheme is asymptotically irrelevant.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has investigated the secrecy in the downlink of Massive multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) system under the presence of a single-antenna active eavesdropper and when the signal at
the base station undergoes one-bit quantization. We investigated the efficacy of two artificial noise
techniques; nullspace artificial noise (NS-AN) and random artificial noise (R-AN). Thus, we have derived
the achievable secrecy rate when the BS uses the maximum-ratio transmission beamforming (MRT-BF)
and zero-forcing beamforming (ZF-BF). Although the very coarse quantization and pilot attack, secure
communication is possible, where the best performance is achieved when ZF-BF is combined with NS-
AN. In fact, we showed analytically that when the eavesdropper is sufficiently close to the intercepted
user, the average secrecy rate drops to zero as the transmit power ratio between the eavesdropper and
intercepted user approaches 1. The practical scenario examined in the paper has further corroborated our
analysis.
It was shown that when the number of BS antennas N grows large, the performance is independent
of the beamforming technique and hence the NS-AN should be exploited to maximize the performance.
This observation has an implication for research into other possible schemes of artificial noise to degrade
the channel of the eavesdropper. Further, it was shown that the total power at the BS can be reduced
proportional to 1/N or 1/
√
N while a positive secrecy rate is maintained, given the ratio between the
eavesdropper’s power and intercepted use’s power is less than (βk/βe)
2, where βk and βe denote the large-
scale fading coefficients of legitimate user (intercepted) and eavesdropper, respectively. This observation
suggests considering other approaches other than artificial noise to enhance secrecy.
Due to the scope limitation of this work, a number of potential issues needs to be considered in the
future, such as power control and optimal design of beamforming. We believe our findings add to the
understanding of the impact of active eavesdropping in quantized Massive MIMO systems.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
From (16), the channel estimate hˆk may be written as
hˆk = λk
(√
γ2p′kτhk +
√
γ2p′eτg + γz˜ + q˜
)
(94)
where z˜ ∼ CN (0, IN ) and q˜ ∼ CN (0, σ2qIN ). Further, since the eavesdropper’s channel g and channel
estimate hˆk are correlated, we can express g as
g = gˆ + ǫ (95)
where gˆ the optimal MMSE solution for g based on the observation hˆk and ǫ is uncorrelated estimation
error with minimum variance. It follows that
gˆ = E
[
ghˆ
H
k
] (
E
[
hˆkhˆ
H
k
])−1
hˆk (96)
From (94) we have
E[ghˆ
H
k ] =
√
λ2kγ
2p′eτIN (97a)
E[hˆkhˆ
H
k ] = λ
2
k(γ
2p′kτ + γ
2p′eτ + γ
2 + σ2q )IN (97b)
Substituting (97a) and (97b) with the definition of λk (14) in (96) yields gˆ =
√
κRhˆk, i.e., the first term
of (50).
From (95) we write ǫ = g − gˆ. From the orthogonality principle, the covariance matrix of estimation
error is given by Cǫ = E[ǫǫ
H ] = E[(g−gˆ)gH ] = (1−κRσ2hˆk)IN , which is given in (52). This completes
the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we derive the two lower bounds (54), (55) on the achievable data rate of legitimate
user k (intercepted) while assuming the BS employs MRT-BF and ZF-BF schemes, respectively.
From Lemma 2, the achievable data rate for any beamforming scheme is again given by
Rk = log
(
1 +
|a|2
σ2neff
)
(98)
where a and σ2neff are defined by
a = c1
√
βkE[h
T
kwk] (99)
σ2neff = c
2
1βk Var(h
T
kwk) +
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
c21βkE[|hTkwj |2]
+ c22βkE[h
T
kSh
∗
k] + βkσ
2
qpd + 1. (100)
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where wj is the j-th vector of the beamforming matrix W and S is the artificial-noise shaping matrix
as defined previously.
In the proofs, we write the channel vector hk as a sum of channel estimate and uncorrelated estimation
error, i.e.,
hk = hˆk + ek (101)
where hˆk ∈ CN is the channel estimate with i.i.d. CN (0, σ2hˆk) components, and ek ∈ C
N is uncorrelated
estimation error with i.i.d. CN (0, 1 − σ2
hˆk
) components, i.e., E
[
eke
H
k
]
= (1− σ2
hˆk
)IN .
In the following, we will evaluate (98) for MRT-BF and ZF-BF. For each beamforming scheme, we
evaluate the deterministic constant a in (99) and variance of effective noise σ2neff in (100).
A. MRT-BF
From (24), the MRT-BF matrix is given by Wmrt := W = Ĥ
∗
. Let wmrt,j = ĥ
∗
j be the j-th column
of Wmrt, i.e., the beamforming vector of user j. In the following, we will evaluate (99) and (100) and
then substitute the results in (98).
From (99), we have
amrt = c1
√
βk E[h
T
kwmrt,k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
I0
= c1
√
βkE[h
T
k hˆ
∗
k]
= c1
√
βkE[(hˆk + ek)
T hˆ
∗
k]
= c1
√
βkE[‖hˆk‖2] + c1
√
βk E[e
T
k hˆ
∗
k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= c1
√
βkNσ
2
hˆk︸ ︷︷ ︸
I0
(102)
and hence
|amrt|2 = 2θβkpd
pi tr(Σ)
σ4
hˆk
N. (103)
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Using (100) we write
σ2neff,mrt =
c21βk Var(h
T
kwmrt,k) +
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
c21βkE[|hTkwmrt,j|2]
+ c22βkE[h
T
kSh
∗
k] + βkσ
2
qpd + 1
= c21βk Var(h
T
k hˆ
∗
k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
+
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
c21βk E[|hTk hˆ
∗
j |2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
+ c22βk E[h
T
k Sh
∗
k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
I3
+βkσ
2
qpd + 1. (104)
The terms I1, I2 can be obtained as follows:
I1 = E[|hTk hˆ
∗
k|2]− |I0|2
a
= E[|(hˆk + ek)T hˆ∗k|2]−N2σ4hˆk
b
= E[‖hˆk‖4 + E[|eTk hˆ
∗
k|2]]−N2σ4hˆk = Nσ
2
hˆk
(105)
I2
c
= E[hTk hˆ
∗
j hˆ
T
j h
∗
k] = E[h
T
kE[hˆ
∗
j hˆ
T
j ]h
∗
k]
= σ2
hˆj
E[‖hk‖2] = Nσ2hˆj . (106)
where in (a) we use I0 = Nσ
2
hˆk
evaluated in (102), in (b) we use the fact that hk and eˆk are uncorrelated
and E[‖hˆk‖4 = N(N + 1)σ2hˆk [11], and in (c) we make use of the statistical independence of hk and
hˆj .
Regarding I3:
Case 1: From (27) , S = IN when R-AN scheme is used, leading to
I3 = E[h
T
kSh
∗
k] = E[‖hk‖2] = N. (107)
Case 2: Again, from (27) we have S = IN − P proj when NS-AN scheme is used, where P proj =
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Ĥ
∗
(Ĥ
T
Ĥ
∗
)−1Ĥ
T
is the projection matrix. Hence,
I3 = E[h
T
k (IN − P proj)h∗k]
= E[‖hk‖2]− E[hTkP projh∗k]
= N − E[(hˆk + ek)TP proj(hˆk + ek)∗]
= N − E[(hˆTkP projhˆ
∗
k]− E[eTkP proje∗k]
a
= N − E[‖hˆk‖2]− E[tr(P proje∗keTk )]
b
= N −Nσ2
hˆk
− E[tr(P projE[e∗keTk ])]
c
= N −Nσ2
hˆk
−K(1− σ2
hˆk
)
= (N −K)(1 − σ2
hˆk
) (108)
where (a) follows due to P projhˆ
∗
k = hˆ
∗
k (by definition), i.e., channel estimate is projected onto itself (b)
due to the statistical independence between channel estimate and estimation error, and in (c) we make
use of E[tr(P proj)] = E[tr(IK)] = K.
Summarizing the above results for I3, we write
I3 =
N if R-AN(N −K)(1− σ2
hˆk
) if NS-AN.
(109)
Substituting (105), (106) and (109) with definitions of c1 and c2 in (104) yields
σ2neff,mrt =
2θβkpd
pi tr(Σ)
σ2
hˆk︸ ︷︷ ︸
beamforing gain penalty
+
2θβkpd
pi tr(Σ)
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
σ2
hˆj︸ ︷︷ ︸
inter-user interference
+ PANk︸︷︷︸
artificial noise
+ βkσ
2
qpd + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
quantization noise plus AWGN
=
2θβkpd
pi
+ PANk + βkσ
2
qpd + 1. (110)
where
PANk =
2θ¯βkpd/pi if R-AN2θ¯βkpd(1− σ2hˆk)/pi if NS-AN. (111)
In (110), the beamforming gain penalty is due to the CSI uncertainty at the user. Substituting (103), (110)
with (111) in (98), the first part of Theorem 1 follows.
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B. ZF-BF
From (24), the ZF-BF matrix is given by W zf := W = Ĥ
∗
(Ĥ
T
Ĥ
∗
)−1 satisfying Ĥ
T
W zf = IK .
Let wzf,j be the j-th column of W zf, i.e., the beamforming vector of user j. In our analysis we need
the following Lemma.
Lemma 4. The expected value of norm squared of j-th column of W zf is given by
E[‖wzf,j‖2] =
σ−2
hˆj
N −K (112)
Proof. Using the channel estimation decomposition in (28), i.e., Ĥ = H˜Σ1/2, the ZF-BF matrix W zf
can be expressed in terms of H˜ and Σ as follows:
W zf = Ĥ
∗
(Ĥ
T
Ĥ
∗
)−1
= H˜
∗
(H˜
T
H˜
∗
)−1 Σ−1/2 (113)
Thus we can write
E[‖wzf,j‖2] = [WHzfW zf]j
=
Σ−1/2E[(H˜T H˜∗)−1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(N−K)−1IK
Σ
−1/2

j
=
[
Σ
−1
N −K
]
j
=
σ−2
hˆj
N −K (114)
where [A]j is the j-th diagonal entry of A. The inner expectation in the second line follows from the
properties of the K ×K central Wishart matrix H˜T H˜∗ [47].
In the following, we will evaluate (99) and (100) and then substitute the results in (98) to obtain the
achievable rate under ZF-BF.
From (99) we have
azf = c1
√
βk E[h
T
kwzf,k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
J0
= c1
√
βkE[(hˆk + ek)
Twzf,k]
= c1
√
βk(E[ hˆ
T
kwzf,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1(by definition)
] + E[eTkwzf,k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0(uncorrelated)
)
= c1
√
βk (115)
and hence
|azf|2 = 2θβkpd
pi tr(Σ−1)
(N −K) (116)
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Using (100) we write
σ2neff,zf = c
2
1βk Var(h
T
kwzf,k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
J1
+
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
c21βk E[|hTkwzf,j|2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
J2
+ c22βk E[h
T
kSh
∗
k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
J3=I3
+βkσ
2
qpd + 1. (117)
Note that we need to evaluate J1 and J2, while J3 = I3 is given in (109).
To evaluate the terms J1 and J2, we proceed as follows.
J1
a
= E[|hTkwzf,k|2]− |E[hTkwzf,k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
J0
|2
b
= E[|hTkwzf,k|2]− 1 = E[| hˆ
T
kwzf,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+eTkwzf,k|2]− 1
c
= E[|eTkwzf,k|2] = (1− σ2hˆk)E[‖wzf,k‖
2]
d
=
(1− σ2
hˆk
)σ−2
hˆk
N −K (118)
where in (b) we use J0 = 1 evaluated in (115), (b) follows because ek and wzf,k are independent and
hˆ
T
kwzf,k = 1 (by definition), and in (d) we use Lemma 4.
Next,
J2
a
= E[|hTkwzf,j|2] = E[|(hˆk + ek)Twzf,j|2]
b
= E[| hˆTkwzf,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+eTkwzf,j|2] = E[|eTkwzf,j |2]
c
= (1− σ2
hˆk
)E[‖wzf,j‖2]
d
=
(1 − σ2
hˆk
)σ−2
hˆj
N −K (119)
where in (b) hˆ
T
kwzf,j = 0 follows by definition of zero-forcing solution, (c) follows because ek and wzf,j
are independent and (d) uses Lemma 4.
Substituting (118), (119) and (109) with the definitions of c1 and c2 in (117), the variance of the
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effective noise can be expressed by
σ2neff,zf =
2θβkpd(1− σ2hˆk)
piσ2
hˆk
tr(Σ−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
beamforing gain penalty
+
2θβkpd
pi tr(Σ−1)
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
1− σ2
hˆk
σ2
hˆj︸ ︷︷ ︸
inter-user interference
+ PANk︸︷︷︸
artificial noise
+ βkσ
2
qpd + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
quantization noise plus AWGN
=
2θβkpd
pi
(1− σ2
hˆk
) + PANk + βkσ
2
qpd + 1. (120)
Finally, substituting (116), (120) combined with (111) in (98), the second part of Theorem 1 follows.
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Here we derive the upper bounds (57), (58) on the information rate Re leaked to the eavesdropper
under MRT-BF and ZF-BF schemes.
From Lemma 1, by the concavity of log(·), applying Jensen’s inequality to (46) yields
Re ≤ log
(
1 + c21βeE
[
wHk g
∗σ−2e g
Twk
])
. (121)
where σ2e is the variance of effective noise given in Lemma 1, which is rewritten again here:
σ2e = c
2
2βeg
TSg∗ + c23βeσ
2
qg
Tg∗ + 1. (122)
Since σ2e is dependent of artificial noise scheme (R-AN or NS-AN), in the following we evaluate (122)
for R-AN and NS-AN schemes, respectively.
Case 1: When R-AN approach is used, from (27) we have S = IN . Hence,
σ2,R-ANe = (c
2
2βe + c
2
3βeσ
2
q )‖g‖2 + 1
a.s.−→ (c22βe + c23βeσ2q)N + 1
= 2θ¯βepd/pi + βepdσ
2
q + 1 (123)
as N grows large which follows from the strong law of large numbers.
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Case 2: When NS-AN approach is used, from (27), we have S = IN − P proj. Using Lemma 3, we
can write
gTSg∗ = (
√
κRhˆk + ǫ)
TS(
√
κRhˆk + ǫ)
∗
= ǫTSǫ∗ = ǫT U˜U˜
H
ǫ∗ (124)
where U˜ ∈ CN×(N−K) comprise (N −K) eigenvectors (each has norm 1) corresponding to the N −K
repeated unity eigenvalues of S. Since N ≫ K (i.e., Massive MIMO setting), U˜U˜H can be very well
approximated by a scaled identity matrix, where the magnitude of off-diagonal entries of U˜U˜
H
are in
fact much smaller than the diagonal entries. Thus,
U˜U˜
H ≈ tr(U˜U˜
H
)
N
=
(
1− K
N
)
IN (125)
Substituting (125) in (124) yields
gTSg∗ ≈ (1−K/N)‖ǫ‖2 a.s.−→ (N −K)(1 − κRσ2hˆk) (126)
Therefore,
σ2,NS-ANe ≈ 2θ¯βepd(1− κRσ2hˆk)/pi + βepdσ
2
q + 1. (127)
We summarize,
σ2e ≈ (PANe + βepdσ2q + 1) (128)
where
PANe =
2θ¯βepd/pi if R-AN2θ¯βepd(1− κRσ2hˆk)/pi if NS-AN. (129)
Substituting (128) in (121) yields
Re . log
(
1 +
c21βeE[w
H
k g
∗gTwk]
PANe + βepdσ
2
q + 1
)
. (130)
The expectation µ := E[wHk g
∗gTw] for both the MRT-BF and ZF-BF cases is evaluated as follows.
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For MRT-BF, setting wmrt,k := wk = hˆ
∗
k (i.e., k-th column of MRT-BF matrix Wmrt = Ĥ
∗
given in
(24)). Using Lemma 3, we write
µmrt := E
[
wHmrt,kg
∗gTwmrt,k
]
= E
[
hˆ
T
k g
∗gT hˆ
∗
k
]
= E
[
hˆ
T
k (
√
κRhˆ
∗
k + ǫ
∗)(
√
κRhˆ
T
k + ǫ
T )hˆ
∗
k
]
= κRE[‖hˆk‖4] + 2√κRℜ{E[hˆTk hˆ
∗
kǫ
T hˆ
∗
k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
}+ E[hˆTk ǫ∗ǫT hˆ
∗
k]
= κRσ
4
hˆk
N(N + 1) + (1− κRσ2hˆk)σ
2
hˆk
N
= σ2
hˆk
(κRσ
2
hˆk
N + 1)N. (131)
where in the fourth line we make use of the fact that ǫ is independent of hˆ each with zero-mean and
E[‖hˆk‖4 = N(N + 1)σ2hˆk [11].
For ZF-BF, settingwzf,k := wk as the k-th column of ZF-BF matrix (24) given byW zf = Ĥ
∗
(Ĥ
T
Ĥ
∗
)−1.
Then by using Lemma 3 we can write
µzf := E
[
wHzf,kg
∗gTwzf,k
]
= E
[
wHzf,k(
√
κRhˆ
∗
k + ǫ
∗)(
√
κRhˆ
T
k + ǫ
T )wzf,k
]
= κRE[‖wHzf,kh∗k︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
‖2] + 2√κRℜ{E[wHzf,khˆ
∗
kǫ
Twzf,k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
}
+ E[wHzf,kǫ
∗ǫTwzf,k] = κR + E[wHzf,kE[ǫ
∗ǫT ]wzf,k]
= κR + (1− κRσ2hˆk)E[‖wzf,k‖
2]
= κR +
σ−2
hˆk
(1− κRσ2hˆk)
N −K (132)
where in the derivation steps of (132) we have used the zero-forcing property: wHzf,kh
∗
k = h
T
kwzf,k = 1,
statistical independence of ǫ and wk, and in the last line we use Lemma 4.
Finally, substituting (131) and (132) combined with (129) and the definition of c1 in (130), (57) and
(58) follow, respectively. In (57) and (58) the notation . is replaced by ∼= where the notion of upper
bound is understood from the bars over the symbols. This completes the proof.
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